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July 31, 2024

Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities  
Prince Charles Building  
120 Torbay Road, P.O. Box 21040  
St. John's, NL A1A 5B2

Attention: Jo-Anne Galarneau  
Executive Director and Board Secretary

**Re: Newfoundland Power Inc. – 2025–2026 General Rate Application – Written Submissions**

Please find enclosed Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro's Written Submissions in relation to Newfoundland Power Inc.'s 2025–2026 General Rate Application.

Should you have any questions, please contact the undersigned.

Yours truly,

**NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR HYDRO**

Shirley A. Walsh  
Senior Legal Counsel, Regulatory  
SAW/kd

Encl.

ecc:

**Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities**

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Maureen Greene, KC  
Board General

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**Newfoundland Power Inc.**

Dominic J. Foley  
Lindsay S.A. Hollett  
Liam P. O'Brien, Curtis Dawe  
Regulatory Email

**IN THE MATTER OF** the *Public Utilities Act*,  
RSNL 1990, Chapter P-47, as amended  
("Act"); and

**IN THE MATTER OF** an application by  
Newfoundland Power Inc. ("Newfoundland  
Power") to establish customer electricity  
rates for 2025 and 2026 ("Application").

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**Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro**

**Written Submissions**

**July 31, 2024**

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## 1.0 Introduction

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro (“Hydro”) is a public utility within the meaning of the Act and is the primary distributor of electricity for the province. Newfoundland Power is Hydro’s largest customer and the energy that Newfoundland Power purchases from Hydro constitutes approximately 85% of the energy that is generated or purchased and transmitted by Hydro for consumption within the province of Newfoundland and Labrador. Hydro is also a customer of Newfoundland Power at several locations throughout the island of Newfoundland including Hydro’s head office in St. John’s.

Hydro's Rural customers served by the Island Interconnected Grid, and its customers in the Labrador Straits area, pay the same rates as those approved by the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities (“Board”) for Newfoundland Power's customers. Also, Hydro's Non-Government customers served by its isolated diesel systems are charged the same rates for their "lifeline" consumption as those charged by Newfoundland Power.

Hydro is acutely aware of the importance of the reliable delivery of electricity to the people of the province, as well as the concerns of customers regarding the cost of living, including electricity rates. As the primary generator and transmitter of power throughout Newfoundland and Labrador, Hydro is also cognizant of the costs associated with ensuring the provision of safe, reliable electricity in an environmentally responsible manner. Hydro’s participation in Newfoundland Power’s 2025–2026 General Rate Application (“GRA”) was intended to gain a better understanding regarding a number of issues underlying Newfoundland Power’s proposals and how those proposals considered the resulting costs to customers. Hydro trusts that its participation in the GRA process has been helpful to the Board in making their determinations.

## 2.0 Newfoundland Power’s Proposals

Newfoundland Power proposes that the Board approve, among other things, an average increase in current electricity rates for all customer rate classes of 5.5% to become effective July 1, 2025.

Newfoundland Power’s Application indicates that the proposed rate increase is primarily the result of:

- a) A proposed increase in the company’s return on equity (“ROE”) from 8.5% to 9.85% to be used in establishing customer rates; and
- b) Increase in costs since its last GRA.

1 The issues within the Application that were of particular interest to Hydro were Newfoundland Power’s  
2 submission that a fair ROE for Newfoundland Power in 2025 and 2026 is 9.85% based on a 45% common  
3 equity ratio; Newfoundland Power’s justification of its operating costs, with focus on executive  
4 compensation and related costs; and Newfoundland Power’s proposed amendments to the definition of  
5 the Demand Management Incentive Account (“DMI Account”).

### 6 **3.0 Settled Issues**

7 Several issues were resolved through settlement negotiations among the parties, and detailed in a  
8 Settlement Agreement dated June 4, 2024.<sup>1</sup> Those issues included the continued suspension of the use  
9 of an automatic adjustment formula for setting the allowed rate of return, the approval of the proposed  
10 calculation of the depreciation expense, approval of the 2025 and 2026 Customer, Energy and Demand  
11 forecast proposed in the Application, and approval of various regulatory accounting issues including  
12 amendments to the DMI Account. Hydro’s concerns with respect to the definition of the DMI Account  
13 were mitigated by the agreed modification of Newfoundland Power’s proposed definition to establish a  
14 threshold of  $\pm$ \$500,000 and Newfoundland Power’s commitment to prepare a report ahead of its next  
15 GRA. That report will review each of Newfoundland Power’s supply cost mechanisms, including a review  
16 of the recommendations in The Brattle Group Report on Newfoundland Power’s Deferral Accounts,  
17 dated April 24, 2024, and a jurisdictional review. A further Settlement Agreement was made between  
18 Newfoundland Power, Hydro, and the Consumer Advocate on June 12, 2024, detailing the agreement by  
19 Newfoundland Power and Hydro to apply to the Board to revise the wholesale rate charged by Hydro to  
20 Newfoundland Power effective January 1, 2025, and to file such application on or about  
21 September 15, 2024.<sup>2</sup>

22 Through the settlement of the above issues, the parties did not then present evidence, examine, cross-  
23 examine or present an argument in relation to the settled issues. The remaining issues of interest to  
24 Hydro that were further examined through the hearing that took place beginning June 13, 2024, were  
25 Newfoundland Power’s proposals regarding ROE, and their overall operating costs.

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<sup>1</sup> Consent #1.

<sup>2</sup> Information Item #2.

## 4.0 Return on Equity

In Newfoundland Power’s 2016 GRA, the Board approved an ROE of 8.5% with a common equity ratio of 45%. Since that time, Newfoundland Power’s approved ROE has remained at 8.5% through two GRA filings, as a result of settlements negotiated with the parties that were then approved by the Board. In all years since 2016, Newfoundland Power has achieved and even exceeded its ROE each year.<sup>3</sup>

In its Application, Newfoundland Power proposed an increased ROE of 9.85% and a consistent 45% common equity ratio. The basis of that proposal was the supposition, detailed by Newfoundland Power’s expert Concentric Energy Advisors, Inc. (“Concentric”), that Newfoundland Power had above-average business risk in comparison to other Canadian utilities.<sup>4</sup> The factors Newfoundland Power argued contributed to that above-average business risk were “. . . weak service territory demographics in comparison to the rest of Canada, a harsh operating environment, [Newfoundland Power’s] small size and its limited cost flexibility.”<sup>5</sup> Newfoundland Power stated that the provincial outlook remained weak with lagging economic indicators, including historically low housing starts, and that the Muskrat Falls Project continued to pose risks to the delivery of least-cost, reliable service. These were the same points put forth by Newfoundland Power in its 2016/2017 GRA, in which the Board determined that Newfoundland Power’s business risk was average and not above average.<sup>6</sup> Newfoundland Power has stated, in this Application, that its 2023 business risks are largely consistent with those described in its 2022/2023 GRA; a Settlement Agreement reached in that GRA, which was approved by the Board, maintained Newfoundland Power’s ROE at the levels approved in its 2016/2017 GRA. As noted later in this submission, the unchanged ROE did not impact Newfoundland Power’s credit rating with the credit rating agencies.

An increase in ROE would be based on changes to the utility’s risk profile and market conditions. Newfoundland Power, and Concentric, submit that market conditions have been volatile. Concentric states in its report that there has been a “fundamental shift” in the economy and capital markets since it

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<sup>3</sup> CA-NP-079, Table 1.

<sup>4</sup> “2025/2026 General Rate Application,” Newfoundland Power Inc., December 12, 2023, vol. 1, Company Evidence, sec. 1.1.4, p. 1-6/22–23, and vol. 2, Expert Evidence, “Cost of Capital,” Concentric Energy Advisors, Inc., November 7, 2023, ch. VI(B)(3)(h), p. 78/3–4.

<sup>5</sup> “2025/2026 General Rate Application,” Newfoundland Power Inc., December 12, 2023, vol. 1, Company Evidence, sec. 1.1.4, p. 1-6/15–17, and sec. 3.3.2, p. 3-22/17–18.

<sup>6</sup> Order No. P.U. 18(2016), p. 19/31–33.

1 had prepared evidence for Newfoundland Power’s last GRA in 2021.<sup>7</sup> However, in 2021 for the  
2 2022/2023 GRA, Concentric’s recommended ROE was 9.8% on 45% equity. The current proposal of  
3 9.85% is only five additional basis points higher than recommended in the 2021 GRA. Mr. Coyne’s  
4 evidence is that this is due to “offsetting factors” in the development of that recommendation.

#### 5 **4.1 Uncertainty Related to Rate Mitigation**

6 Among the uncertainties Newfoundland Power submitted that contribute to its business risk, are factors  
7 associated with the Muskrat Falls Project. Specifically, Newfoundland Power references concerns  
8 regarding costs and reliability that could put pressure on Newfoundland Power’s ability to earn a fair  
9 return.

10 On May 7, 2024, the provincial government issued Order in Council OC2024-062 directing Hydro to “. . .  
11 structure any application for utility rate increases such that retail rate increases to domestic rate class  
12 customers attributable to Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro shall be targeted at 2.25 per cent per  
13 year” for the period up to and including 2030.<sup>8</sup>

14 Legal counsel for the Consumer Advocate, Mr. Coffey, KC, suggested to Mr. Coyne, on behalf of  
15 Concentric, that there is support from the Government of Canada and the provincial government to  
16 ensure rates don’t rise uncontrollably.<sup>9</sup> However, Mr. Coyne testified that he would view the rate  
17 mitigation plan as a “stop-gap measure” that did not address the huge problem and only recovered a  
18 small portion of the cost up to 2030.<sup>10</sup> Mr. Coyne did not appreciate or understand that the balance of  
19 the costs associated with the Muskrat Falls Project that was not recovered from customers and federal  
20 funding sources during that period would be covered by investment from Hydro, and would not be  
21 deferred for future collection from customers.<sup>11</sup>

22 Hydro submits that the rate mitigation plan has removed the uncertainty in the near term with respect  
23 to costs and rate impacts related to the Muskrat Falls Project,<sup>12</sup> and, within that period, there is now less

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<sup>7</sup> “2025/2026 General Rate Application,” Newfoundland Power Inc., December 12, 2023, vol. 2, Expert Evidence, “Cost of Capital,” Concentric Energy Advisors, Inc., November 7, 2023, ch. III(A), p. 9/17–18.

<sup>8</sup> OC2024-062 (*Hydro Corporation Act, 2007*, SNL 2007 c H-17), <<https://www.exec-oic.gov.nl.ca/public/oic/details?order-id=21851>>.

<sup>9</sup> Transcript, June 18, 2024, p. 57/17–p. 58/10.

<sup>10</sup> Transcript, June 18, 2024, p. 62/8–22.

<sup>11</sup> Information Item #7, and Transcript, June 19, 2024, pp. 51–52.

<sup>12</sup> Transcript, June 13, 2024, p. 139/2–p. 140/22.

1 concern regarding the impact of Muskrat Falls-related costs on forecast demand from customers,<sup>13</sup> one  
2 of the main issues raised by the credit rating agencies.<sup>14</sup> Hydro notes that Mr. Trogonoski of Concentric  
3 testified that they would typically categorize short term as anywhere from one to three years.<sup>15</sup> Moody’s  
4 Investors Service (“Moody’s”) had also noted that if there were to be increases in rates from the  
5 Muskrat Falls Project that lead to lower electricity demand, the difference would be expected to be  
6 temporary.

## 7 **4.2 Uncertainty Related to Reliability**

8 The reliability of the Labrador-Island Link (“LIL”) and its impact on the reliability of supply to  
9 Newfoundland Power is also a concern noted by Newfoundland Power in support of its argument that it  
10 has above-average business risk. However, the LIL has now been commissioned and in the first year  
11 since it was commissioned it had an Equivalent Forced Outage Rate of 2.70%.<sup>16</sup> Newfoundland Power  
12 noted in its response to NLH-NP-091 of this proceeding that during the 2019–2023 period, only 2% of  
13 Newfoundland Power’s outages to distribution customers were caused by Hydro outages.  
14 Newfoundland Power further confirmed that although they expressed concerns about the future  
15 reliability of supply from Hydro, they had not factored those concerns into its 2025–2026 forecast. If this  
16 experience with the LIL does not alleviate the concern with reliability, at minimum, it does not worsen  
17 the estimation of the risk that has already been considered by the credit agencies.

## 18 **4.3 Credit Agencies**

19 Newfoundland Power utilizes two credit rating services, Moody’s and DBRS Morningstar (“DBRS”). Both  
20 Newfoundland Power and its expert Concentric referenced the concerns expressed by Moody’s and  
21 DBRS regarding how higher supply costs may impact customer demand and timely cost recovery for  
22 Newfoundland Power.

23 The credit ratings from Moody’s—Baa1 Stable—have been consistent since 2005.<sup>17</sup> This includes the  
24 period from 2016 to the present when Newfoundland Power has stated very similar business risk  
25 principles. Notably, the rating was provided before the certainty of the province’s rate mitigation

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<sup>13</sup> Transcript, June 13, 2024, p. 142/12–19.

<sup>14</sup> “Credit Opinion – Newfoundland Power Inc. – Update to credit analysis,” Moody’s Investors Service, April 30, 2024.

<sup>15</sup> Transcript, June 18, 2024, p. 44/24–25.

<sup>16</sup> Information Item #5, p. 20.

<sup>17</sup> Transcript, June 17, 2024, p. 35/13–14.

1 announcement on May 16, 2024.<sup>18</sup> The credit ratings from DBRS–A Stable – have also been consistent,  
2 since approximately 1996.<sup>19</sup> With the described business risks being largely consistent since 2016, aside  
3 from changes that would reduce risk, (i.e., the rate mitigation announcement and the commissioning  
4 and positive first year of operation of the LIL) Hydro believes it is likely that the credit ratings would not  
5 be negatively impacted in such a way as to require the proposed increase in ROE.

#### 6 **4.4 Comparator Groups**

7 Concentric’s opinion, contained within its Cost of Capital report, was that the North American Electric  
8 proxy group in Figure 21 was the most appropriate comparator for Newfoundland Power. Concentric  
9 further confirmed its opinion that a country risk adjustment, as had been previously ordered by the  
10 Board in Order No. P.U. 18(2016), was not necessary.<sup>20</sup> The use of the North American Proxy Group,  
11 without adjustment, results in a proposed ROE for Newfoundland Power that results in the second  
12 highest weighted ROE in the context of the Canadian electric and gas investor-owned utilities.<sup>21</sup> In fact,  
13 in comparison to those same Canadian electric and gas investor-owned utilities, Newfoundland Power is  
14 already above the weighted Canadian electric average at its current ROE of 8.5% and common equity  
15 ratio of 45%.

#### 16 **4.5 Impacts of Increased ROE**

17 An increase in the test year ROE for Newfoundland Power will also result in a material increase in  
18 Hydro’s supply costs and revenue requirement, and could contribute to customer rate changes in the  
19 long term. When asked whether this relationship should be considered when establishing the test year  
20 ROE for Newfoundland Power, Newfoundland Power cited Order No. P.U. 18(2016), among other  
21 decisions of the Board, for the Board’s description of the fair return standard as one that: “. . . must be  
22 commensurate with return on investments of similar risk and sufficient to assure financial integrity and  
23 to attract necessary capital.”<sup>22</sup> Newfoundland Power’s position was that the interests of third parties are  
24 not a component of the fair return standard.

25 Newfoundland Power submitted that the Board should consider whether consideration of third parties’  
26 interests is in accordance with the stand-alone principle, which Newfoundland Power noted the Board

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<sup>18</sup> Transcript, June 17, 2024, p. 45/4–12.

<sup>19</sup> Transcript, June 17, 2024, p. 61/19–22.

<sup>20</sup> PUB-NP-115, and Transcript, June 19, 2024, p. 77/15–p. 79/6.

<sup>21</sup> Undertaking #6.

<sup>22</sup> PUB-NP-134.



1 has upheld in past rulings. Board Order No. P.U. 19(2003) cited by Newfoundland Power, was one where  
2 the Board had to determine whether to consider the relationship between Newfoundland Power and its  
3 parent company Fortis Inc. (“Fortis”), and the impacts of that relationship on Fortis. The Board  
4 determined at that time to continue to treat Newfoundland Power as a stand-alone utility, but did note  
5 that “The Board is not prepared to simply presume a stand-alone utility in the future and has an  
6 obligation to ensure the financial integrity and independence of Newfoundland Power is fully protected  
7 on behalf of those it serves.”<sup>23</sup> Fortis is not a utility under the regulation of the Board, nor is Fortis a  
8 distinct customer in the province that would be afforded consideration by the Board separate from the  
9 Board’s consideration of customers generally. However, the Board has a legislative duty to consider  
10 Newfoundland and Labrador customers. The consideration of how an increased ROE would impact  
11 Hydro’s revenue requirement, inclusive of payments made to cover Lower Churchill Project costs under  
12 the Transmission Funding Agreement, is material in considering the ultimate impacts of Newfoundland  
13 Power’s requests on customers.

14 Mr. Coyne, on behalf of Concentric, was asked whether the Board should take into account in their  
15 consideration of the appropriate fair return for Newfoundland Power the flow-through impacts on  
16 Hydro’s rates, and ultimately, customers. Mr. Coyne noted that the Board has the responsibility to set a  
17 fair return, utilizing the fair return standards, but also has a broader set of responsibilities in setting just  
18 and reasonable rates.<sup>24</sup> This is consistent with the decision of Mr. Justice Green in *Newfoundland (Board*  
19 *of Commissioners of Public Utilities)(Re)(1998)*, 64 NFLD. & PEI R.60 (NFLD.C.A.) (“Stated Case”),  
20 summarized in Board Order No. P.U. 19(2003),<sup>25</sup> noted among other general principles that the Board  
21 must balance the interests of public utilities and electrical consumers. The Board noted that the Court,  
22 in the Stated Case, clearly set out the requirement of the Board to balance the utility’s right to a fair  
23 return and the consumer’s right to reasonable access to power. The utility’s right to a fair return is not a  
24 solitary consideration.

25 Hydro submits that the Board must use its discretion and judgement to consider the inputs and analysis  
26 used to determine the proposed ROE and determine what is appropriate in this context. The Board has  
27 the jurisdiction to balance Newfoundland Power’s right to earn a fair return with the overall impacts on  
28 customers. In light of the relatively unchanging nature of the business risks and the apparent minimal

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<sup>23</sup> Order No. P.U. 19(2003), p. 39.

<sup>24</sup> Transcript, June 19, 2024, p. 118/1–121/7.

<sup>25</sup> Order No. P.U. 19(2003), p. 13.

1 impact of the changing market conditions, Hydro does not believe that Newfoundland Power has  
2 demonstrated that an increase to the ROE is needed to meet the fair return standard or indeed that the  
3 existing ROE of 8.5% does not already meet that standard as it has done since 2016.

## 4 **5.0 Operating Costs**

5 Newfoundland Power’s evidence indicates that gross operating costs are forecast to increase by  
6 approximately 3.9% per year from 2022 to 2026, with operating labour costs increasing by 3.1% over the  
7 same period.<sup>26</sup> Although Newfoundland Power’s operating costs had been declining from 2014 to 2018,  
8 they had started to slightly increase in 2019. Aside from a substantial dip in 2020, which recovered in  
9 2022, the costs have continued to increase.<sup>27</sup> The increase in operating costs is actually 18% between  
10 the 2023 Test Year to the proposed 2026 Test Year,<sup>28</sup> and the impact from the forecast increases make  
11 up approximately 1.6% of the proposed 5.5% rate increase for July 1, 2025.

12 Newfoundland Power argued that the general reason for the increases are inflationary pressures and  
13 that they are doing all they can to find efficiencies and manage costs;<sup>29</sup> however, Newfoundland Power  
14 could not provide examples of specific actions or efficiencies that were any different from what they had  
15 included in previous GRAs.<sup>30</sup> Newfoundland Power noted that productivity allowances are intended to  
16 provide an incentive to manage costs and find efficiencies.<sup>31</sup> Hydro observes the inclusion of the same  
17 productivity efficiencies within the 2025 and 2026 test years that have been consistently applied since  
18 the 2013/2014 GRA; however, for five of the ten years between 2013–2023, a primary reason for  
19 variances in Newfoundland Power’s actual regulated earnings is attributed to lower operating costs than  
20 forecast (2015, 2016, 2017, 2020, and 2021).<sup>32</sup> In seven years of that ten-year period, Newfoundland  
21 Power has achieved higher than forecast other revenue (2013, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, and  
22 2023).<sup>33</sup> As a result of the outperformance of test year forecasts, the additional revenues and  
23 efficiencies have resulted in higher earnings than forecast for the last ten years for Newfoundland  
24 Power shareholders.<sup>34</sup> Hydro submits that this information, in addition to the substantial increase

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<sup>26</sup> “2025/2026 General Rate Application,” Newfoundland Power Inc., December 12, 2023, vol. 1, Company Evidence, sec. 2.1, p. 2-2/11–12.

<sup>27</sup> NLH-NP-011.

<sup>28</sup> NLH-NP-030, att. A.

<sup>29</sup> Transcript, June 27, 2024, p. 63/24–p. 64/7.

<sup>30</sup> Transcript, June 14, 2024, p. 55/12–p. 57/13, and Transcript, June 27, 2024, p. 62/19–p. 64/19.

<sup>31</sup> PUB-NP-140.

<sup>32</sup> PUB-NP-075.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> PUB-NP-075, att. A.

1 between test year operating costs, and Newfoundland Power’s indication that it has taken no additional  
2 actions to reduce costs for its proposed test years, it is appropriate for the Board to issue directives to  
3 Newfoundland Power that will provide incentive for Newfoundland Power to manage costs and find  
4 efficiencies that provide benefit to both customers and shareholders.

## 5 **5.1 Executive Compensation**

6 Labour costs are 54% of Newfoundland Power’s operating costs,<sup>35</sup> and Newfoundland Power’s evidence  
7 indicates that labour rate increases are 3.00% in 2022, 2.75% in 2023, 3.80% in 2024, 4.45% in 2025, and  
8 4.50% in 2026.<sup>36</sup>

9 For executive compensation, the comparator group used to determine the basis for reasonable  
10 compensation is the broad Canadian Commercial Industrial market.<sup>37</sup> This comparator group of 390  
11 organizations included only 3 electrical utilities, 3 Atlantic Canada organizations, and no organizations  
12 from this province. The Korn Ferry Report noted that jobs are compared between those of similar skill,  
13 effort, and responsibility and not necessarily the same title or role. The organizations utilized in this  
14 comparator group are classified as “private sector commercial industrial” and are considered valid by  
15 Korn Ferry based on the assumption that Newfoundland Power competes for its executive resources  
16 with organizations across the “breadth and depth of business sectors across Canada.”<sup>38</sup>

17 The current executives at Newfoundland Power were all either previous employees of Newfoundland  
18 Power or its parent company Fortis and recruited locally.<sup>39</sup> Further, in over 20 years approximately 3  
19 executives have been hired from outside the Fortis Group of Companies. Very few Newfoundland Power  
20 executives have been recruited from across the country, outside of those already employed with  
21 Newfoundland Power’s parent company.

22 Hydro questions whether the comparator group utilized is the most appropriate given the lack of utility  
23 representation and geographic consideration of organizations included within it. Korn Ferry states that  
24 the comparator group does not include public sector utilities because Newfoundland Power has a very

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<sup>35</sup> Transcript, June 14, 2024, p. 76/14–19.

<sup>36</sup> “2025/2026 General Rate Application,” Newfoundland Power Inc., December 12, 2023, vol. 1, sec. 2.4.1, p. 2-31, f.n. 57. The annual base compensation increases and short-term incentive payments for executives during that period are listed in the response to PUB-NP-029, Tables 3 and 4, respectively.

<sup>37</sup> “Executive Compensation Review (“Korn Ferry Report”),” Korn Ferry, April 11, 2024, app. C.

<sup>38</sup> “Executive Compensation Review,” Korn Ferry, April 11, 2024, sec. 4, p. 7, and Transcript, June 25, 2024, p. 102/8–23.

<sup>39</sup> Transcript, June 14, 2024, p. 25/13–19.

1 different approach on executive compensation, as they do not take into account constraints such as  
2 fiscal policies, provincial policies or other public policies. Newfoundland Power states that it defers to its  
3 expert Korn Ferry on the reasonableness of its executive compensation;<sup>40</sup> however, Korn Ferry does not  
4 have access to historical data that would be important in making those determinations<sup>41</sup> and stated that  
5 the Board of Directors of Newfoundland Power is ultimately responsible for decisions on changes to  
6 comparator groups.<sup>42</sup> Further, Korn Ferry’s comparator group included only a limited number of  
7 privately owned utilities, which would be of key importance to the composition of an appropriate  
8 comparator group for Newfoundland Power at any level. As a result, Korn Ferry was unable to complete  
9 the analysis on how Newfoundland Power’s executive compensation compares to that of other  
10 Canadian privately owned or Crown-owned regulated public utilities and could not provide that  
11 information.<sup>43</sup>

12 At present, Newfoundland Power’s total executive remuneration is slightly higher than the commercial  
13 industrial market median by about 5–6%.<sup>44</sup> The evidence from Korn Ferry notes that excluding the non-  
14 regulated portions puts the amount of Newfoundland Power executive compensation recovered from  
15 customers below the market median compensation.<sup>45</sup> Hydro suggests that if the overall total  
16 compensation were at or below the market median, the amount that was recovered from customers  
17 would be even less.

18 The underlying assumptions for executive compensation appear to have not been fully analyzed for their  
19 appropriateness and applicability to Newfoundland Power and its operating environment. With labour  
20 costs being such a substantial portion of operating costs, and executive compensation a predominant  
21 portion of those, it is key to ensure that the appropriate comparator group is utilized such that the  
22 benchmarks for compensation are accurate and attuned to similar organizations—particularly when the  
23 results have direct implications for rates charged to customers.

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<sup>40</sup> Transcript, June 14, 2024, p. 115/17–22.

<sup>41</sup> CA-NP-308, part (b).

<sup>42</sup> Transcript, June 25, 2024, p. 86/4–6.

<sup>43</sup> CA-NP-309.

<sup>44</sup> Transcript, June 25, 2024, p. 15/8–12.

<sup>45</sup> Transcript, June 25, 2024, p. 16/4–9.

## 6.0 Conclusion

When considering the applications that Newfoundland Power had, or intended to have, before the Board and their associated rate increases, the cumulative proposed rate increases from July 1, 2024, and July 1, 2025, were approximately 16%.<sup>46</sup> Of the 5.5% proposed in the Application, 1.6% is related to the requested ROE increase,<sup>47</sup> and a further 1.6% is related to the increases in operating costs including labour.<sup>48</sup>

As referenced above, the Court in the Stated Case noted that the Board must balance the interests of public utilities and electrical consumers and, in doing so, must balance the utility's right to a fair return and the consumer's right to reasonable access to power. Newfoundland Power's response to how it had considered the interests of its customers and how to limit the impact on them was to note that its operations had been managed in a manner consistent with the provincial power policy (i.e., in a manner that results in power being delivered to customers at the lowest possible cost, in an environmentally responsible manner, consistent with reliable service).<sup>49</sup> Newfoundland Power stated that a fair ROE would provide it with the ability to attract incremental capital on reasonable terms, which would be a benefit to customers. The Board must determine whether the increases in Newfoundland Power's costs are reasonable based on the evidence presented. In Hydro's view, the evidence does not support the proposed increased ROE and, at best, it is not clear as to whether operating costs and in particular executive compensation, have been managed in such a way as to ensure that the costs Newfoundland Power seeks to recover from customers through rates are reasonable.

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<sup>46</sup> When including an additional 4.3% related to rebasing, Newfoundland Power rate increases are approximately 20% as noted in Transcript, June 14, 2024, p. 51/12–p. 55/10.

<sup>47</sup> Transcript, June 14, 2024, p. 139/5–10.

<sup>48</sup> Transcript, June 14, 2024, p. 67/20–p. 68/1.

<sup>49</sup> NLH-NP-062.